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Introduction
This is an experimental study on information transparency and longterm employment relationships. The paper rst asks specically what types of fairness rms have in mind and workers respond to. Then it studies the impacts of information on rms' and workers' choices and on whether there are eciency and welfare gains from information transparency.
The key nding is that transparency serves as an eective mechanism to improve both worker welfare and total market eciency. When workers are fully informed about rms' productivity levels and potential prots, rms propose higher wages that represent fair divisions of total surplus. Workers respond to generous oers with high eort levels. However, workers' response is not constant and depends on the following factors. First of all, it is elevated with information transparency. That is, for given wages, workers provide more eort under full information. Secondly, it depends on whether a wage oer represents a fair share of the nal surplus.
The denition of fairness is based on the behavioral and experimental paradigm by Ernst Fehr and his coauthors Schmidt, 1999 and Brown, Falk and Fehr, 2004 are some of the best known of this work). The models of fairness assume that there are fair-minded workers who adjust their behavior in the following manner: If the wage oer potentially represents an equal division of surplus, the fair-minded worker will react by supplying high eort to support that outcome. Otherwise, she will simply not be happy and reduce her eort. Thus, there is continuity in the worker's reaction to wage oers. Preferences for fairness do not imply blindly choosing the outcome where the surplus is split 50%-50%. Instead, these preferences are "focal", i.e the worker focuses on what the wage oer represents. This paper contributes to the behavioral account of labor markets in a few dierent ways. First, the ndings can explain the positive rm size-wage relationship, in line with much empirical evidence (e.g. Schmidt and Zimmermann, 1991) . Second and most important, transparency promotes fairness and increases workers' eort, hence it increases the size of the total surplus and the average payo for workers. Therefore, from the social planner's perspective, transparency should be desirable. Finally, the evidence here indicates that total welfare and eciency can be increased if workers (or their unions) can convince rms to reveal information on prots.
Experimental Approach to Labor Relationships
Many theories based on fairness, inequity aversion and reciprocity have been oered to explain rm and worker behavior. Well documented evidence from laboratory and eld experiments conrms the existence of behavioral motives in labor market decisions. However, the role of information transparency has yet to be explored in detail.
In this paper, we consider a setup which is applicable in a broad range of market scenarios. Firms and workers sign incomplete contracts and interact repeatedly. There are more workers than jobs, so that the competitive equilibrium prediction is for the wage to be at the opportunity cost of the workers. Likewise, there is no incentive, in a one shot game, for a worker to exert more than the minimum level of eort, because any additional effort only decreases the worker's share of the surplus (since his share is the xed wage he has already accepted), while increased eort only increases the rm's share. However, several facts stylized and empirical facts about labor relationships are at odds with this view. What is observed is that wages tend to be above the opportunity cost of workers, and eort levels tend to be increasing in the level of the wage oers. The interpretation usually given for this is that workers are concerned about the "fairness" of any given wage oer. This is the fairness version of the eciency wage hypothesis (Akerlof, 1982, Akerlof and Yellen, 1990) . Fairness is usually interpreted as "equal shares," which is a natural focal point in an experiment where roles are chosen randomly and there is no compelling reason why either side would be entitled to a larger share than the other.
The idea that workers respond to eciency wages is well understood. According to the fair-wage eort hypothesis, workers compare wages with what they think is fair before making an eort choice. Models of reciprocity and inequity aversion explain deviations from standard labor market predictions Fehr et al. 1993 Fehr et al. , 1996 Fehr et al. , 1998 . Concerns for fairness, trust and positive/negative reciprocity do exist in labor relationships and they signicantly aect market outcomes.
It is established that preferences for fairness are present in labor relations and that fairness serves as an incentive mechanism for workers to perform well (see Fehr et al. 2008) . The inequity aversion model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) has been the framework for most experiments. The model is simply based on the idea that there are both selsh and fair-minded workers in the labor market. Fair-minded workers respond to generous oers with a generous eort level, thus rms have an incentive to oer rents even in oneshot interactions. But, the importance of fairness is amplied in repeated settings. Contractual incompleteness implies rewards and punishments in future periods and gives rise to "relational contracts" which are self-enforcing in nature (Macleod and Malcolmson, 1989) . Since renegotiation and reputation become a concern, selsh workers have an incentive to mimic fair-minded workers and supply high eort when oered a generous wage. The presence of fair-minded workers also guarantee that greedy oers are penalized with low eort levels. Ultimately, the interaction between fairness concerns and repeated game incentives result in an outcome that involves non-minimal wage and eort and signicant surplus sharing (Brown, Falk, Fehr, 2004) . Brandts and Charness, 2004) . In a typical gift exchange experiment, the ordering of events is as follows. The rm proposes a xed wage to be paid, but does not enforce worker performance. Then the worker chooses an eort level which determines her and the rm's nal payos. In this paper, we extend this paradigm in a couple more directions. First, we focus on longterm contracting by allowing employers to make oers to specic workers in a private fashion (similar to Brown, Falk, Fehr, 2004) . Second, we introduce heterogeneity in the following sense: rms have multiple jobs with dierent productivity levels, i.e. at given eort levels some jobs are more productive or more protable than others. Third and most important, we introduce the following information problem to the design: when the market is completely transparent, workers are fully informed about the exact productivity of their jobs, thus, they know the size of potential nal surplus and prots for their rms before making an eort decision; however, in the absence of transparency, workers are left in the dark about the total surplus created as a result of their eorts.
The dierence between these two hypothetical states (full information and limited information) summarizes the role of information on employment relations, fairness and eciency. It is almost impossible to nd eld data that ts into this ideal setup. However, experimental methods permit exogenous variations in the information structure.
Experiment Design
A total of 52 subjects participated in 4 sessions and interacted 646 times.
Each session included 18 periods with 3 employers and 10 workers. The sessions were conducted in Gregory Wachtler Experimental Economics Laboratory. Subjects were seated in cubicles with computers connected to each other by z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007) . A typical session took an hour and a half and the average payment was approximately $20.
In a given session, 3 participants were assigned the role of an individual rm and 10 were assigned the role of a worker; these roles remained the same 6 throughout the session. The program assigned each rm and each worker an identication number which was xed throughout the session. Thus, workers were able to recognize each rm and vice-versa in all future periods, thus allowing renegotiation.
This setup, with repeated interactions, was adapted from Brown, Falk and Fehr (2004) . Then it was modied in the following ways to study information eects.
Each rm had three jobs with dierent productivity levels. The productivity coecient, p, could take three dierent values: 10, 8 or 6 for high, medium or low productivity respectively.
Each rm could make multiple oers but was allowed to hire only one worker for each job. The oers included a wage to be paid, w, and a non-
Each rm had the option of submitting private and/or public oers. Public oers were known to and could be accepted by all workers. Private oers were known by and directed to specic workers. Each worker could accept or reject oers. If a worker accepted an oer, she chose her actual eort level (e), and thus determining her nal payo.
The payos were calculated in experimental currency units.
The rm's prot after each trade was π f = pe − w, where p is the productivity coecient.
The worker's payo conditional on employment was π i = w − c(e) where c(e) is the cost of eort. The cost schedule is given in Table 1 . The rms were 7 There was involuntary unemployment every period since there were 10 workers but 9 job openings. If a worker failed to nd a job, she was paid an unemployment benet of 5 experimental currency units.
When the next period started all workers and rms could renew contracts or nd dierent matches. Firms and workers used the same ID numbers throughout the sessions, so that they could nd (or avoid) each other in every subsequent session.
Two treatments were designed in order to analyze how information affects wage proles and performance. In the Full Information Treatment (FULL), the rm told workers the productivity level as part of its job oer.
Workers could observe the productivity of each job. In the Limited Information Treatment (LIM), the employers were privately informed about the productivity levels at the beginning of each period, but this information was not revealed to the workers. Table 2 summarizes the aggregate data on limited and full information sessions. Full information extracts higher wages and eort levels compared 8 Table 3 suggests that the payo distribution between workers and rms is close to being equal with full information, especially for medium and high productivity jobs. The transparency seems to work to the rm's benet if the job is of low productivity, but it works against the rm if the job is of high productivity.
Findings

Private Oers and Contract Renewal
Private oers allow for renegotiation and contract renewal. The main instrument to engage in relational contracts was the option of sending private 9 oers. Figure 1 shows that the percentage of private oers increases over time regardless of whether the regime is limited information or full information.
Moreover, the majority of oers made in private were aimed at contract renewal according to Figure 2 .
(Figures 1-2)
The use of private oers suggests that rms are interested in forming long-term relations. Information does not seem to have a particular impact on contract renewal as the rms want to hold onto productive relationships in any case. 
Firms
While initially wages are around the same, the impact of information becomes clear later on. Figure 3 shows that average wage oers are consistently higher under information transparency.
( Figure 3 ) Table 5 shows the results of the wage regression. Good reputation motivates generous wages. Likewise, private wage oers are greater than publicly made ones. The job characteristics are signicant in explaining the wage decision; i.e. oers increase with the productivity level. There are withinrm wage dierences in both sessions; however the dierence is more dened when full information is enforced. Firms signicantly separate wage oers.
Limited information on the other hand results in weak separation of payos among co-workers; while both signicantly greater than zero, coecients for 
Workers
Eort provision not only determines nal payos but also potentially aects the length of the relationship. Figure 4 depicts the evolution of average wages over time. The rst thing to notice is that the average eort is higher in full information sessions.
( Figure 4 ) Table 6 shows the results of the random-eects ordered probit estimation of eort. Not surprisingly the eort choice depends signicantly on the wage oer. But there are two very interesting observations in Table 6 . The rst one is that wages extract more eort under full information. The availability of information just by itself seems to be important for worker's performance. 
Secondly, the marginal eect of a wage oer is higher for low productivity jobs. That is, the workers do take into account that a dollar increase in wages represents a greater share of the total surplus if the job is of low productivity.
Information transparency naturally improves relations between parties, while the lack of transparency reduces reciprocity by workers.
Desired eort is signicant in explaining eort as well. Compliance with the rm's expectations must be an enforcement mechanism for higher performance and long lasting relations. This could also be considered as a simple form of cheap talk. The probability to work harder increases upon contract renewal too. Figure 5 shows that average rm prot is more or less the same regardless of the information structure. Figure 6 conrms that rms end up with 
Fairness and Eciency
Conclusion
Fairness concerns shape employment relationships signicantly. Theories that model social preferences are based on the assumption that people with 14 fairness preferences reduce own payos to avoid unfair outcomes or punish unfair behavior. The existence of fair-minded people in the market increases wages and eort levels above the market clearing levels both in one shot and repeated interactions. Eort increases with wage but this eect is amplied in repeated settings due to renegotiation and reputation formation. Experimental research on employment relationships has shown that fairness is an incentive mechanism for workers to perform well and rms to oer rents to their workers. The contribution of this paper is on the role of information on workers' and rms' choices and on whether there are eciency and welfare gains from information transparency.
The ndings of this paper suggest that information aects the market outcome in signicant ways. Information transparency on rms' prots motivates rms to oer higher wages which induce a relatively more fair distribution of payos and workers respond to wage increases by increasing effort. Most importantly, workers' response is elevated with information transparency. That is, for given wages, workers provide more eort under full information. The availability of information just by itself might have a positive psychological eect on worker's choice. The evidence is hard to explain with existing theories, and requires further research. Furthermore, workers respond to rms' intentions about how to share the potential nal surplus. A dollar increase implies a larger share of surplus if the job has low productivity. The evidence shows that the marginal eect of a wage increase is slightly higher for lower productivity jobs.
Under full information, wage oers are higher and rms separate oers across dierent jobs, i.e. high wages are oered for high productivity jobs, that result in equal division of total surplus. Workers reciprocate to these oers by exerting more eort, thus increasing gains from interaction. On the other hand, wages are lower and more compressed when workers are left in the dark. Since rms have an incentive to pretend that their jobs have low productivity, workers do not choose high eort levels to increase rms' payos. In the end, workers' payos are reduced and rms collect a larger of the surplus which is now lower in the absence of information transparency.
Transparency promotes preferences for fairness and increases workers' eort, hence it increases the size of the total surplus and the average payo for workers. Therefore, from the social planner's perspective, transparency should be desirable. Finally, the evidence here indicates that total welfare and eciency can be increased if workers (or their unions) can convince rms to reveal information on prots.
The experiment is convenient for addressing some further questions. Although the ndings from this specic experiment suggest that rms are not hurt by full information, it is still a question whether rms would want to reveal productivity information if they were given the option. Another question is whether the unemployment rate (which was constant in the experiment) changes the impact of information transparency. Concerns for fairness and the extent that it motivates performance are subject to question under various rates of unemployment. 
